The word `governance’ has been used with different meanings in different parts of Asia during different times. Different meanings occur in documents such as constitutions and in actual practice. In present-day Singapore the state interpretation of governance is complete control of society. In Hong Kong — which till 1997 was a British colony — state control is minimal. Yet in both of these cases the state plays very little role in recognizing and promoting the rights of its subjects. Conceptions of governance in China and Vietnam also do not include respect for the rights of individuals. Under the military dictatorship in Pakistan there is hardly any conception of systematic governance. Since the establishment of military dictatorship in Cambodia in the early seventies, followed by the Pol Pot regime — which destroyed both a large section of the population and the entire fabric of society — governance has remained at a very rudimentary level. This situation prevails despite UN intervention by way of a peacekeeping force. The 35-year-long dictatorship in Indonesia brought the military into all aspects of life. Though the upper leadership of the country changed with the fall of Suharto, the massive influence of the army within the state structure has created virtual anarchy. The Burmese dictatorship has reduced governance to direct military will, without any recognition for the rights of the people. The Indian state is a very different model, in which a democratic form of governance is in serious conflict with a social structure based on caste; there, all minorities suffer severe forms of discrimination. Other countries in South Asia — such as Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh — follow a similar pattern.
Present day realities are very much related to the past. Under colonial domination, the development of the state in Asian countries was disrupted and retarded. This happened in some countries for three to four centuries and in others for lesser periods. The conflicts between previously existing systems and the subsequent colonial models have left tremendous confusion. This confusion has been inherent in the various models of governance that have followed the colonial period.
Prior to colonial times there had been many forms of governance during different periods in the region. Even within a given territory now known as a single nation there were many kingdoms with different ways of governance. Among these I wish to mention three models that had wide influence: first, the Indian model of absolute power known as Arthasastra model, second, the Buddhist-Asokan model, and third, the Confucian model. These are referred to as `models’ for convenience, pointing to some central feature of each which may be relevant for present day discussion. (It must, however, be noted that there are ways of governance among the adivasi — ancient indigenous peoples, also called tribal peoples — which are very different to the three dominant models mentioned here.)
The Arthasastra was written by Canakya or Kautalya around the fourth century BC. One of the eminent historians of Indian History, D D Kosambi, has observed that, The title Arthasastra means `The science of material gain’ — for a very special type of state, not for the individual. The end was always crystal clear. Means used to attain it needed no justification. There is not the least pretence of morality or altruism. [In the Arhtasastra] the only difficulties ever discussed, no matter how gruesome and treacherous the methods, are practical, with due consideration to costs and possible effects… Espionage and the constant use of agent-provecateurs is recommended on a massive and universal scale by the Arthasastra. The sole purpose of every action was safety and profit of the state. Abstract questions of ethics are never raised or discussed in the whole book. Murder, poison, subversion were used at need by the king’s secret agents, methodically and without a qualm… Strife for the throne is treated as a minor occupational hazard by Canakya. No regard to morality or filial piety is ever questioned. He quotes a predecessor’s axiom; `Princes, like crabs, are father eaters — ‘ The eleventh book (probably shortened in transmission) of the Arthasastra is devoted to the methods of systematically breaking up free, powerful, armed tribes of food producers that had not yet degenerated into absolute kingdoms. The main technique was to soften them up for disintegration from within, to convert the tribesmen into members of class society based upon individual private property..
(D D Kosambi, The culture and civilization of Ancient India, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1977, pp. 141-46.).
The use of absolute power grew even worse under the caste system, which classified people into separate categories on the basis of birth. The caste system became even more draconian by about the eight century AD, with the introduction of the Law of Manu, one of the worst forms of repressive governance ever known to humanity. Though democratic governance under the new Indian constitution (adopted in 1950) replaced the Law of Manu, the latter remains powerful, and has even eaten up much of the influence of the new constitution.
Divisions of caste split India’s heart and soul. The historical beneficiaries of this model of governance were the upper castes, led by the Brahmin caste. The system that they developed over thousands of years is known as Brahminism: a collection of social regulations that amounted to the world’s most comprehensive system of repression. Through a small percentage of the population being able to gain total control of the vast majority, Brahminism was able to create extreme self-contempt among the larger part of the population, and extreme self-confidence among the ruling minority. The millions of tricks the Brahmins put together to achieve this system were called `religious rituals’. No religious ritual was too mundane and hypocritical. Brahmins gave prescriptions about eating, sitting, drinking water, use of toilets, marriage, love making, reading, dress, and everything that is possible for a human being to do. Without a place for morality, ideas of transparency and accountability were alien to this system of governance.
The Buddhist_Asokan model fundamentally differs from the
Arthasatra model in that it accepts and treasures the equality of everyone. Asoka’s acceptance of Buddhist ideals is described by another eminent Indian historian, Romila Thapar, thus:
Buddhism of [Emperor Ashoka’s] age was not merely a religious belief; it was in addition a social and intellectual movement at many levels, influencing many aspects of society. Obviously, any statesman worth their name would have had to come to terms with it.
(Romila Thapar, History of India, Volume 1, Penguin Books, 1966, p. 85.).
Kosambi has also written:
The fundamental change was not religious so much as in the attitude shown for the first time by an Indian monarch towards his subjects: `Whatever exertion I make, I strive only to discharge the debt that I owe to all living creatures.’ This was a startlingly new and inspiring ideal of kingship, completely strange to earlier Magadhan statecraft, where the king symbolised the state’s absolute power. The Arthasastra king owed nothing to anyone; his sole business was to rule for the profit of the state, with efficiency as the one ultimate criterion. With Asoka, the social philosophy expressed in the sixth-century Magadhan religions had at last penetrated the state mechanism… The king himself would now make a complete tour of inspection throughout his domains every five years. Such a tour must have taken up a good part of the five years, which implies constant travelling except in the rains. All previous royal journeys of the sort had been for personal pleasure such as hunting, or on military campaigns. Every high administrative official was likewise ordered to make a similar quinquennial tour through the entire territory under his own jurisdiction. In addition, there was created a new class of plenipotentiary supervisors with control over officials and special funds. The title was Dharma-mahamatra, which can be translated `minister of morality’, and would later be `senior regulator of charity and religious affairs’. The correct translation at the Asokan stage is `High Commissioner of Equity’. Equity is the principle beyond formal codified law and common law upon which both law and justice are supposedly based.
(Kosambi, The culture and civilization of Ancient India, pp. 141-48.).
During this period, Buddhism spread to all parts of India and many other parts of Asia. Though Buddhism was wiped out brutally from India, in a genocide that is yet to be fully studied, Buddhist influence and Asoka’s ruling style have remained in the Indian psyche. In fact, Gandhi’s non-violence was based on Buddhist ideas. In other lands where Buddhism spread — like Sri Lanka, Nepal, Burma, Cambodia and Thailand — its influence later waned when the Brahmin influence and that of the Law of Manu followed. Even in countries that later became Islamic — such as Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh — the underlying influence of these two models remains. Countries such as China, Vietnam and Japan came under the sway of both Buddhism and Confucianism and thus a blend of the two is found to varying degrees in the traditions of these countries.
Confucius had a strong belief in a natural order that was also a moral order reflecting ancient virtues. The task of government was to rectify society and restore it to ancient virtues. Under this approach, good governance is a matter of setting a moral example for people to follow. People have to be properly instructed in how to practice ancient virtues. To accomplish this task, the government must be run by persons of morality. Confucius said, “If a ruler himself is upright, all will go well without orders. But if he himself is not upright, even though he gives orders they will not be obeyed”(Analects XII:17). In this sense, the Confucian tradition favours the rule of men rather than the rule of law. What matters to good governance is the moral character of officials.
The traditional Chinese government was composed of a single bureaucracy headed by the emperor, with all officials sharing a common ideological orientation based on the Confucian tradition. The legitimacy of the emperor was built upon a mandate from heaven. The government stressed the importance of authority and order. It was very difficult for normal people to exert political influence; they were obliged to obey officials. But the mandate of heaven also required the emperor to look after the interests the people. If the emperor turned to oppressive rule, the officials had a responsibility to persuade him to go back on the right track. However, this internal check often did not work, because it required the officials to have great courage and to risk their lives. Without external checks and the rule of law, absolute power finally led to the corruption of government, as persons of virtue left. In this situation, the Confucian tradition allowed for a revolt against the government by the people, as the emperor was seen as having violated the mandate of heaven. However, in Chinese history, successful revolts only brought a new emperor and left the system unchanged, starting another cycle of rule and chaos.
The evidence from various projects on governance in Asia shows clearly a very superficial approach to the political and social changes required to achieve good governance; that is, democratic governance. In fact, the term `governance’ is often regarded with cynicism in the region. Words such as `transparency’ and `accountability’ are of little meaning when the very state system stands opposed to the basic norms of democracy. Huge sums spent on projects for good governance only provide a cover for dictators engaged in brutal repression, keeping good face in Western forums and offering a defense for human rights abuses when criticized by United Nations agencies.
For systems of governance to be relevant to Asia, sensitivity both to the contemporary realities and past traditions is required. Such knowledge cannot be expected of persons who come from the west with masters degrees on governance, eager to teach what they have learned. New forms of governance only become relevant to a place when introduced through dialogue with the people, cultivating cultural sensitivity over many years.
What is common to all Asian countries developing forms of good governance is the need to create a space for genuine participation. Participation is not possible without institutional reforms that make it possible. The institutions requiring reform that are most relevant to ensuring such participation are the judicial and law-enforcement agencies. Westerners often stress the need for elections as the most important aspect of promoting good governance. However, elections without the proper intervention of a functioning judicial system and democratic law enforcement agencies end in corruption of the electoral process itself. This is the actual situation in most Asian countries today. Those who talk of governance show a remarkable incapacity to understand that judicial and law enforcement reforms are vital to its success. One reason may be that the westerners of today have mostly inherited developed judicial and law-enforcement systems and so fail to adequately reflect on these matters when discussing governance. Unless this is corrected, the discourse on governance in Asia will be futile.
It is essential that debates and discussions on cultural traditions go on in Asian civil society, in order to prepare the ground for worthwhile projects on governance. Such debates are in fact taking place. Attempts to repudiate authoritarian traditions and enhance more democratic traditions are very much a part of the current discussion on democratization, human rights and good governance. While fundamentalists attempt to interpret tradition to support modern projects of restrictive governance, there are other attempts to interpret tradition creatively, by allowing for historic circumstances and choosing paths that support democratic developments and make participation, accountability and transparency possible. It follows that the Arthasastran, Buddhist-Asokan and Confucian models, among others, are a part of our historic roots that deserve critical evaluation today.
