The present report concerns a mission to Indonesia undertaken from 15 to 24 July 2002 by the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers. The Special Rapporteur had received information concerning the state of the rule of law, the administration of justice and in particular the independence of the judiciary, with allegations of widespread and systematic corruption within the administration of justice affecting all actors, including judges, prosecutors, police and other court officials.
General background
The Special Rapporteur had received information concerning the state of the rule of law, the administration of justice and, in particular, the independence of the judiciary in Indonesia.
The Special Rapporteur was informed that, since independence, the administration of justice had suffered much damage as it had been used by the executive as a tool to implement government policy. In turn, judicial power steadily eroded. The Special Rapporteur was informed that, in the current post-Soeharto era, the judiciary was no longer perceived as an instrument of government policy but rather as open to the highest bidder in a system in which the mechanisms of control and accountability are weak and ineffective at best and non-existent at worst. This has, the Special Rapporteur was informed, in turn served to create a mentality within certain segments of Indonesian society in which it is considered routine to attempt to bribe judges, where the office of the judge and the judiciary as an institution have completely lost their prestige and dignity, and where judges themselves have, over the years, lost their self-esteem.
Constitutional provisions concerning the administration of justice
The Constitution in force in Indonesia dates from 1945 and has been amended four times since 1998. The First Amendment altered the status and powers of the President. The Second Amendment includes Chapter XA on human rights; article 28D provides that each individual has the right to recognition and protection before the law, certainty of the law and the right to equality of treatment before the law. Article 28I protects the individual against retrospective application of laws. The Third Amendment enacted on 9 November 2001, inter alia, expands the powers of the Supreme Court and provides for the establishment of a Constitutional Court and Judicial Commission. The Fourth Amendment, adopted in August 2002, provides, inter alia, for direct election of the President and Vice-President.
There is no constitutional provision expressly guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary. There is also no express constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to a fair trial.
Article 24B deals with the Judicial Commission. Article 24B (1) characterizes the Judicial Commission as independent with the “authority to propose candidates for appointment as justices of the Supreme Court and shall possess further authority to maintain and ensure the honour, dignity and behaviour of judges”. The members of the Commission shall possess legal knowledge and experience, and shall be persons of integrity with a personality that is not dishonourable, and are appointed to, and dismissed from, their position by the President with the approval of the DPR [House of Representatives]. The structure, aims and membership of the Commission is regulated by law.
Article 24C deals with the Constitutional Court. It has the power to try a case at the first and final levels, and shall have the final decision-making power in reviewing laws against the Constitution, determining disputes over the authority of State institutions, whose powers are given by the Constitution, deciding on the dissolution of political parties, disputes with respect to a general election, and with respect to the removal of the President. It is composed of nine persons selected by the President: three persons are proposed by the Supreme Court, three by the DPR, and three by the President.
Neither the Constitutional Court nor the Judicial Commission has been set up.
The judiciary
There are three main pieces of legislation dealing generally with the judiciary: Law 14/1970 concerning the Basic Principles of Judicial Power, Law 2/1986 concerning the General Judicial System, and Law 35/1999 on Amendment of Law 14/1970, which included a number of significant changes intended to bring about greater independence of the courts.
Article 1 of Law 14/1970 provides that the judiciary is the independent power of the State in administering justice to maintain law and justice based upon “Pancasila”, the five principles governing the Indonesian State and society. The five principles are: belief in the one and only God; a just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations of representatives; and social justice for all Indonesian people.
Article 4(3) of Law 14/1970 provides that any interference in the exercise of the judicial function shall be prohibited except for cases referred to in the Constitution.
The court system
Article 10 of Law 14/1970 provides that the Supreme Court stands at the apex of the court system. Beneath the Supreme Court, there are four branches of the judiciary–General Courts of Justice, which include the High Courts and the District Courts (approximately 349 in total); Religious Courts of Justice, which include the Religious Court of Appeal and Religious District Courts (approximately 383 in total); Military Courts of Justice, which include the Military Court of Appeal (approximately 31 in total); and Administrative Courts of Justice, which include the Administrative Court of Appeal (approximately 27 in total).
The Minister of Justice informed the Special Rapporteur that Indonesia requires approximately 7,000 judges for its 800 courts. Currently, there are approximately 3,500 judges, with 300 or so judges appointed to the bench each year. There are 51 justice positions on the Supreme Court, of which 19 are currently unfilled.
Appointment, transfer and discipline of judges
Article 31 of Law 14/1970 provides that judges are to be appointed and dismissed by the President. This provision is further amplified by the subsequent Law 2/1980, which provides in article 31 that a judge is appointed and dismissed by the President on the proposal of the Ministry of Justice in consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Law 2/1986 lists the qualifications required for appointment as a judge, which are to be: an Indonesian national, devoted to God Almighty, loyal to the Pancasila and the Constitution, a civil servant, a law graduate, to be dignified, honest, just and of good behaviour, and not to be a current or former member of the Communist Party.
After graduation from law school, judges undertake a one-year training programme currently provided by the Ministry of Justice. Those who pass this training, work for one to two years in district courts as court clerks before qualifying for the position of junior judge. The first assignment of a junior judge is usually to a small district court.
According to Law 40/1995, appointment to the Supreme Court requires five years’ experience as a chief justice of an appellate-level court or 10 years’ experience as a judge of an appellate-level court or 15 years’ experience in the legal field, i.e. non-career judges. Article 24A (2) of the Constitution provides that the judge must have integrity and a personality that is not disgraceful; he/she must be fair, professional and possess experience in the legal aspects; and the appointment will be made by the Judicial Commission. Pending the establishment of the Judicial Commission, appointment to the Supreme Court follows a “fit and proper test” conducted by the DPR, which receives nominations from the DPR, the Supreme Court, civil society, and the Government. For the current 19 vacancies on the Supreme Court, 72 out of the 74 names under consideration by the DPR were proposed by the Supreme Court.
Proposals for transfer of judges originate from the Ministry of Justice, which is then approved by the Supreme Court. However, the final decision on transfer rests with the Ministry of Justice. Transfers are made for three reasons–to benefit the court, to benefit the judge and to benefit the judge’s family. The Special Rapporteur was advised that, in 2001, approximately 750 judges were transferred, of whom 20 judges were transferred by the ministry as punishment for misconduct.
Article 20 of Law 2/1986 provides that a judge can be removed for (a) commission of a criminal act; (b) committing a disgraceful act; (c) continuously neglecting their duties; or (d) violation of their oath of office. An Inspector General, also located in the Ministry of Justice, receives complaints relating to the alleged misconduct of judges. Of the approximately 125 to 150 complaints received per year, the Special Rapporteur was advised that approximately 20 judges are found guilty of misconduct. The Director-General was unable to explain to the Special Rapporteur, however, what these cases of misconduct related to or the sanction for such misconduct.
Concern was repeatedly expressed to the Special Rapporteur that the Ministry of Justice exercises excessive power in the appointment, transfer and discipline of judges, increasing the likelihood of making judges beholden to the ministry. Specific concerns were also shared with the Special Rapporteur regarding the fit and proper test for appointment to the Supreme Court; inter alia, that there was insufficient inquiry into a candidate’s track record and that subjective criteria are used for selection.
Accountability of judges
The Special Rapporteur was informed that there is very little formal substantive supervision of judges and no effective accountability mechanism. The Supreme Court has appointed a Deputy Chief Justice for supervision. However, concern was expressed that the Deputy Chief Justice has no full-time staff and is not fully familiar with the functions of the task required. The Special Rapporteur was also informed that though senior judges are required to supervise the work of junior judges, the former’s heavy workload made that task difficult. This assessment was borne out during the Special Rapporteur’s discussions with justices of the Supreme Court, one of whom stated that “what is required is more supervision in the process and integrity of judges and court officials. Our culture and habits are also not conducive” [to this supervision].
The Special Rapporteur was also advised that there is no systematic publication of court proceedings and decisions.
In addition to the concerns expressed over the lack of an effective accountability mechanism to oversee the conduct of judges, attention was focused on the civil service status of judges. Prior to recent reforms, Indonesian judges were considered as civil servants. The Elucidation to Law 2/1986 makes it clear that Act 8/1974, Principles concerning Civil Servants, is applicable to judges. This required the Ministry of Justice to evaluate a judge’s efficiency and effectiveness like other civil servants. Moreover, article 13 provides that the general supervision of judges as civil servants shall be conducted by the ministry. Notwithstanding the recent legal reforms whereby judges are no longer considered as civil servants, a number of judges informed the Special Rapporteur that, after 37 years of serving as a civil servant, the challenges of altering mindsets to that of an independent and impartial judge are significant.
Incidence of judicial corruption
The following incident was recounted to the Special Rapporteur by a former Director-General of Anti-Corruption Activities in the Office of the Attorney General: We had arrested a suspect in connection with corruption over a pre-trial detention and had obtained a detention warrant to question the suspect further. The warrant was about to expire, so I went before a judge to request its extension. In order for the warrant to be extended, I gave the judge a bribe. I was reimbursed for my trouble from the official budget of the Office of the Attorney General.
Many and varied interlocutors with whom the Special Rapporteur met–judges, prosecutors, senior lawyers, members of civil society, academics and government officials–referred to the problem of endemic and systematic corruption within the administration of justice, in particular, within the judiciary.
During the Special Rapporteur’s mission, a number of reports were issued by various Indonesian organizations alleging widespread and systemic corruption within the administration of justice system.
In July 2002, an Indonesian NGO, Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), reported that corruption takes place at every step in the criminal and commercial legal processes. Corruption patterns cited in the criminal court include choosing a judge and negotiating the verdict with the judge. In civil proceedings, corruption is reported to take place by, inter alia, giving extra money to register the case and choosing a favourable judge. ICW also reported that a number of these practices, particularly the trading of verdicts, affect judges of the Supreme Court.
These allegations are supported by complaints received by the National Ombudsman Commission, which reported that in 2001, its second year of operation, 45 per cent of complaints received related to allegations of judicial corruption. A 2001 national survey on corruption, undertaken by the Partnership of Governance Reform, ranked the judiciary, along with the traffic police and the customs authority, as the most corrupt public institution in Indonesia. Judges and prosecutors were consistently ranked among the least respected of public officials.
A number of reasons were proposed to the Special Rapporteur to explain the incidence of corruption within the judicial system. This included, primarily, the low wages paid to judges, who are paid only slightly higher than other civil servants.
The low salaries paid to judges also reflect the budget of the court system as a whole, which is considerably less than the total required.
A number of senior lawyers referred to the double standard being applied by foreign companies operating in Indonesia. On the one hand, these companies want an environment of legal certainty in order to secure their investments; on the other hand, when it comes to their own cases, some companies are alleged to pressure judges and use unscrupulous lawyers in order to ensure a ruling in their favour. These concerns were echoed to the Special Rapporteur by representatives of the donor community who admitted that it was only now that the international community had itself been affected by the calamitous legal situation existing in Indonesia, and in particular, after it had been the victim of corrupt practices, that it had been forced to realize the severity of the situation.
The police and the public prosecution service
As the Minister of Justice pointed out to the Special Rapporteur, corruption is not specific to the judiciary, but affects the Indonesian bureaucracy as a whole. The Special Rapporteur was repeatedly told that corruption plagues the police and the prosecution service.
The Indonesian Judicial Monitoring Society (MAPPI) reported recently on its survey undertaken in April 2002 of 600 respondents, including judges, lawyers, academics, prosecutors, police and civil society. The survey cited allegations that police were bribed either to conceal evidence or not to detain suspects, and prosecutors were bribed either to report insufficient evidence to bring charges or that the facts do not constitute a crime.
The legal profession
The Special Rapporteur was informed that there are no figures available on the number of practising lawyers. Membership of the seven bar associations is voluntary. There is no law applicable to the organization of the legal profession, though the Special Rapporteur was informed that a draft bill on advocates, regulating the profession, has been before the DPR for the past year. Representatives of some bar associations told the Special Rapporteur that they would be supportive of an organized profession and of making membership mandatory, provided that their independence was not affected.
Each bar association has its own code of ethics. The seven bar associations, including the three largest, have adopted the Joint Code of Ethics, implementation of which, the Special Rapporteur was informed, is the responsibility of each bar association. This has the effect that, inter alia, lawyers expelled from one bar association are able to join others and continue to practise.
Law graduates can immediately be recruited to work in a private firm or company. To work as a trial lawyer, however, requires that law graduates take an entrance examination, conducted by the Ministry of Justice, in order to obtain a license to practise. Continuing legal education programmes for lawyers is non-existent.
The Special Rapporteur was repeatedly informed about the use of so-called “hanky panky” or “black sheep” lawyers who have built up their practices and reputations through corrupt practices, such as bribing judges, prosecutors and other court personnel. Indeed, many judges referred to the pressure put on them by such lawyers who, judges alleged, frequent judges’ chambers before hearings in the absence of the other party so as to influence the judge’s decision.
Steps towards reform
The Government, DPR and judiciary have embarked upon a number of judicial and legal reform programmes. The Government’s programme for judicial reform is set out in the five-year National Development Plan and identified, inter alia, the following issues as the most problematic:
- The lack of independent, impartial, clean and professional courts due to government and other influences, as well as the lack of quality, professionalism and morality of the law enforcement apparatus (includes courts, police, prosecution);
- The lack of public confidence in the courts; and
- The large number of corruption, collusion, nepotism and human rights cases that are still outstanding.
The Minister of Justice [has] listed a number of steps taken to combat corruption, including adoption of a law on corruption, collusion and nepotism, the settlement of human rights violations, and development of a law on the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Commission. The Special Rapporteur was informed, however, that notwithstanding these initiatives, [government partners consider] that the Government’s attention to reform of the justice sector has been sporadic and extremely slow.
In May 2000, a joint investigating team (JIT), coordinated by the Attorney General, was established by presidential decree to investigate and prosecute corruption, initially in the court system and subsequently in other areas as its capacity increased. However, the Supreme Court decided that the JIT was unlawful because it had not been established by law, as required by the law on the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Commission. However, it was the very absence of the existence of the Anti-Corruption Commission that encouraged the then Attorney General to establish the JIT.
Other bodies supporting the process of judicial reform include the National Law Commission and the National Ombudsman Commission. Since its establishment in 2000, the National Law Commission has focused on developing a law reform programme. The results of a long process of research and consultation undertaken by 15 sectoral working groups are expected to be discussed by the Commission and other key partners in the near future, with a master plan for legislative reform to be adopted thereafter.
The National Ombudsmen Commission was established by presidential decree in 2000. Its main focus is on maladministration of the Government and the judiciary. In 2000, 35 per cent of the 1,723 complaints received related to the functioning of the courts. In 2001, 45 per cent of its 511 cases related to the courts. A draft law on the establishment of the Ombudsmen is currently before the DPR and provides the Ombudsmen with the power to investigate and make recommendations. The Special Rapporteur was informed that both institutions have been underfunded and have lacked political support.
A number of Indonesian NGOs, including the Indonesian Institute for Independent Judiciary and the Center for Indonesian Law and Policy Studies, have recently been formed to support legislative and judicial reform and are working in a collaborative way with the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court.
In December 2002, the DPR adopted the law establishing the Anti-Corruption Commission. The Commission will be composed of five members and will have full authority to both investigate all cases of corruption involving State officials and prosecute these officials in an ad hoc court. The Commission is authorized to take over existing corruption cases being investigated by the Police and Office of the Attorney General. The relationship between the Commission and other existing structures designed to tackle corruption, such as the Ombudsmen, which is also seeking to be endowed with investigatory powers, was not clarified to the Special Rapporteur.
Conclusions
When the Soeharto regime was overthrown, an opportunity arose for the review of the 1945 Constitution and the adoption of a new Constitution to meet the aspirations of the people for a democratic country under the rule of law, as happened in the Philippines in 1987. Unfortunately, this did not happen. The piecemeal amendments to the Constitution since 1998, and moreover some of these amendments yet to be implemented are not satisfactory.
The independence of the judiciary is the cornerstone for the rule of law in any democratic society. The Special Rapporteur notes with extreme concern the lack of a culture of judicial independence in the country. For the first 40 years after independence, judicial power was seen as an extension of executive power. This has resulted in the judiciary being plagued with corrupt practices.
The Special Rapporteur notes with particular concern the excessive influence of the Ministry of Justice over the appointment, transfer and discipline of judges.
The Special Rapporteur also finds that the practice of transferring judges for misconduct to other courts instead of bringing them to a more formal disciplinary process is inappropriate and harmful to the interests of the public and consumers of justice.
It is apparent to the Special Rapporteur that a considerable change in the mindsets of judges is required in order for them to fully disengage from their former civil service mentality and accept and fully understand their new roles as responsible for ensuring an effective and functioning independent and impartial judicial system.
With regard to judicial corruption, the Special Rapporteur notes with surprise that in spite of the widespread allegations of judicial corruption statistics on prosecution or discipline for judicial corruption are unavailable. Though the Special Rapporteur appreciates that judicial corruption is difficult to detect, failure to investigate it effectively brings the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court into disrepute.
The vast majority of interlocutors with whom the Special Rapporteur discussed the matter admitted the prevalence of corruption within the judiciary. Supporting research undertaken by Indonesian organizations on the matter also supports these findings. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur finds that concerns regarding allegation of widespread corruption are real. Though there is no doubt that there are some honest judges, the integrity of these judges is tainted by unabated and widespread judicial corruption.
While there is admission from all quarters, including the Government, of the very high incidence of corruption in the public sector and in particular in the administration of justice, and calls for reforms are heard loud and clear both domestically and internationally, the slow pace with which the Government and the DPR are addressing the issues has called into question the political will of these institutions to deal with the situation on an urgent and priority basis. The Special Rapporteur fully understands that in this process of transition, Indonesia is beset by a number of challenges and that identifying priorities is a perilous task. The Special Rapporteur is convinced, however, that public confidence in the Government and its administration of justice is seriously undermined; there is a risk that the public will resort to self-help and take justice into their own hands unless something is urgently done. If corruption is not arrested and excised, the negative impact on the flow of investments will continue and the rule of law in Indonesia will remain in jeopardy.
The Special Rapporteur considers that it is essential to place the allegations of judicial corruption in the context of the administration of justice system as a whole. Corruption is not limited to the judiciary. Instead it spreads as cancer in the entire system, the judiciary, police, prosecutors and Office of the Attorney General.
Inadequate financial resources for the judiciary have also encouraged bribery and corruption, though the Special Rapporteur is of the view that low salaries alone do not contribute to the prevalence of corruption within the judicial system. Instead the incredible incidence of corruption reported seems, in part, a reflection of the institutional culture of corruption as an acceptable or, at the very least, tolerable practice of doing business.
The Special Rapporteur finds that the absence of publicly available information on court proceedings and decisions further fuels the lack of confidence with which the judiciary is held by the public at large. Corruption flourishes in a web of darkness and secrecy. By making judges publicly accountable for their conduct, the temptation to risk taking unsound decisions and follow unsound processes could be reduced.
An independent and organized legal profession is an integral part of the administration of justice and provides strength and support for the maintenance of an independent judiciary. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur notes with disappointment that though there are at least seven bar associations, there is no law applicable for the organization of the legal profession in Indonesia. Though there is a uniform code of ethics adopted jointly by the seven bar associations, implementation varies with each bar association. There is no procedure to discipline lawyers. This means that there is no real procedure to seek accountability from the legal profession. The procedures for qualification and admission are not adequately provided for under the law; there are some who conduct legal practices without adequate qualification. The Special Rapporteur finds it quite amazing that during his mission and after, no one was able to inform him as to how many lawyers there are in Indonesia.
The lack of regulation has allowed the legal profession to breach its professional responsibilities owed to the court, the client and society and to seek to improperly influence the judge.
The lack of a professional framework entails that the legal profession is not in a position to advocate effectively for change in the administration of justice. Its potential as a voice for reform is drowned by a cacophony of competing interests of each bar association. The profession is generally perceived as self-centred and works for its own enrichment.
The judicial reform process that began in 1999 has been slow. There are a number of initiatives under way but it is unclear how they relate to each other. Whatever changes and reforms may have been undertaken by the Government and the judiciary, they are not seen in reality.
Harassment and intimidation of judges, prosecutors and lawyers, particularly those handling human rights-related cases, is a matter of grave concern. Based upon the information provided to the Special Rapporteur, the governmental authorities appear to have failed in their duty to protect these judges, prosecutors and lawyers in areas of conflict.
Further, the Special Rapporteur is distressed to learn that, notwithstanding the attention focussed on the issue of victim and witness protection, at both a domestic and international level, including through the visit to the country in 1998 of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its cause and consequences, there is no comprehensive mechanism to guarantee protection for witnesses and victims. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur welcomes the protection provided by certain NGOs to victims and witnesses, but this should not be regarded as a substitute for a state-funded programme.
Recommendations
With regard to constitutional provisions concerning the administration of justice:
a) The Constitution should be amended to provide a complete separate chapter for the provision of an independent judiciary and an impartial prosecutorial service providing for fair trial procedures in accordance with international standards; and
b) Procedures for judicial appointments at all levels must be such as will ensure the appointment of persons who are best qualified for judicial office. In accordance with principle 10 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, and article 12 of the Statement of Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, any mode of appointment must safeguard against improper influences being taken into account so that only persons of competency, integrity and independence are appointed.
With regard to judicial corruption:
a) The Special Rapporteur considers that the prevailing situation requires drastic, urgent and far-reaching action. The Chief Justice, supported by the Ministry of Justice, should as a matter of priority initiate both a short-term and a long-term strategy with processes to address complaints of judicial corruption;
b) In the short term, and with the main objective of restoring public confidence in the system, the Chief Justice should be empowered to take leadership to deal with this matter supported by both the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice;
c) As a first step the Chief Justice should make clear to all judges that judicial corruption needs to be addressed seriously and urgently. Accordingly, the Chief Justice should call upon all judges who had indulged in corrupt practices to own up and resign from their judicial positions within a prescribed time period, say six months, in which event no punitive or further action will be taken against them;
d) In the event these judges fail to resign voluntarily within that time period, the Chief Justice should inform the judges that all allegations of judicial corruption or suspicions of judicial corruption will be investigated promptly and action taken;
e) As a second step, a transitional judicial disciplinary tribunal should be established guaranteeing the right to due process for judges. Upon a finding of corruption by such a disciplinary tribunal, the judge should be removed. Disciplinary proceedings before such a tribunal and a finding by that tribunal should be distinct from criminal proceedings before the ordinary criminal court and any finding by that court;
f) The procedure outlined provides judges with the opportunity to deal with the situation themselves and allows corrupt judges to leave quietly or be investigated and removed after due process. It will protect the honest judges and will restore confidence in the system speedily;
g) The fact that judges could not easily be appointed to replace the removed judges should not be used as an excuse not to adopt this recommendation. Concurrently the process of selection and appointment of new judges should be undertaken;
h) Similar urgent procedures must be adopted to address corrupt practices in the prosecutorial and police services. Action against lawyers involved in such practices too must be urgently addressed;
i) The establishment of the transitional disciplinary tribunal will require separate legislation and the DPR should attend to this need on an urgent basis. The body should be composed of the Chief Justice, a representative of the Ministry of Justice, senior lawyers and legal academics. The procedure should conform with the minimum standards provided in principles 17-20 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. Being a transitional tribunal to deal with the current crisis of confidence in the judiciary and as a short-term measure a time limit for its existence should be provided;
j) As a long-term measure the Judicial Commission should handle all judicial disciplinary measures; and
k) The DPR must give this matter urgent attention.
A review of the salary scales of judges should be undertaken, drawing upon the comparative experiences of other States with similar socio-economic and cultural characteristics.
Publishing and disseminating court proceedings and decisions should be made a priority.
With regard to the legal profession:
a) The legal profession should be organized by legislation providing for a self-governing and regulating bar association. The independence of the profession should not be impinged upon. It is essential that a self-disciplining mechanism for the legal profession be established by law to enforce the code of ethics for the profession; and
b) In the interim, the seven bar associations should seek to integrate their activities. In this regard, a useful model to emulate is the integrated bar association of the Philippines.
The need for a holistic approach to reforms:
a) Reform should be holistic and the various phases coordinated. Addressing the judiciary per se will not be sufficient; the entire prosecutorial system and the police force, too, need to be addressed. A comprehensive master plan, encompassing the entire administration of justice system and identifying a coordinated structure needs to be prepared and implemented;
b) The Government should substantially increase budget allocations to finance these reforms for the next 5 to 10 years to complement the assistance committed by international donors;
c) Civil society should be encouraged to play an active role in the reform process to ensure that reform addresses public aspirations and rebuilds confidence of the public in the administration of justice system;
d) The reformers within the system should be supported by the international community. The support of the international community to the reform process is crucial; it is essential that its support is channelled into the coordinated approach; and
e) The effect of these reforms should measure up to the minimum set out in the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary; the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers; and the Guidelines on the Role of Lawyers.
This article consists of extracts from the 13 January 2003 report of the then-UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Dato’ Param Cumaraswamy, on his visit to Indonesia (E/CN.4/2003/65/Add.2). This was the last visit by a UN expert in this capacity to Indonesia, and the observations of the rapporteur are as relevant today as at time of writing, and should be recalled and cited by all persons concerned with the state of human rights and the judiciary in Indonesia. The full report can be found on the UN website.
