In March 2006, the legal counsel for two of the five prisoners known as the Abadilla Fivesubmitted a complaint to the United Nations Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In their complaint, they cited that the Philippine government had violated its obligation under the ICCPR, particularly article 14 (3), when the Supreme Court (SC) and subsequently the Court of Appeals (CA) continuously failed to complete the appellate review of their clients’ sentence for many years.
In replying to their complaint on November 2006, the Philippine government, through its Mission to the United Nation, argued the SC has exercised its authority according to law and Constitutional right. When the SC decided to transfer the appellate review to the CA they did it so according to its Constitutional power. Although the SC left the automatic review of the sentence pending for five years without decision, they felt that this was not a matter of concern for them. What does matter was the SC’s decision to transfer it to the CA was in compliance with its newly adopted rules regarding appellate reviews. The full text of the Philippine government’s reply can be read at: http://material.ahrchk.net/philippines/AHRC-STM-028-2008.pdf
Transferring the review of sentence to the CA and giving the latter the power to make judgment though according to law in no way exonerates the SC of their failure to promptly resolve the case as they should have done. The SC was therefore complicit in the further delay of the review of prisoners’ sentence. At the time when the CA took over jurisdiction of reviewing the case, it had already dragged on for nearly three years; and despite nine justices having been appointed, one after the other failed to come to any conclusion. The Philippine government, thus, has effectively implied that the SC and CA’s failure to conclude review for five and nearly three years respectively does not violate its obligation under the Covenant.
The government may be able to justify the SC and CA actions as lawful and within their authority. However, the prisoners affected by their failure cannot be forced to accept that after years of delay in reviewing their sentence the matter still falls on the context of what is lawful, normal and rational. While it may be true that the procedures were done according with the law these procedures and exercise of power by the SC has resulted in the delay in concluding the review. Does this mean that regardless of the state having failed to conclude the review for so many years the prisoners have no choice but to simply accept this? In this case, it is the lawful exercise and subsequent implementation of such rules that has aggravated the delay. This cannot be acceptable as it has violated the prisoner’s right to have their conviction effectively reviewed.
So what does the right to an effective review mean? It is a prisoner’s right to have his conviction reviewed effectively and provides him remedies where he can make an appeal for his conviction or procedures where appeals can be made. If the review is “unduly delayed” by the reviewing court this constitutes a violation of the Covenant. The General Comment No. 32 (49) of the UN Human Rights Committee on the ICCPR has clearly emphasized this that only when the review of prisoner’s conviction is done promptly there can be no violation to the Covenant. The continued delay in the appellate review of the sentence of the Abadilla Five though obviously does not conform to this principle.
Whether the review was unduly delayed or not should also measured on what is a generally acceptable principle and practice of the judiciary’s role involving the administration of justice. Is an eight year delay acceptable? By the governments defense of the SC and CA it has given justification to their actions and implies that the delay in reviewing the Abadilla Five’s is deemed acceptable as their practice in the country’s system of justice. Forget about whether this does not conform to the notion and rational principle of the judiciary’s role in administering justice. The prisoners are forced to accept that their suffering was inevitable in this condition.
This illustrates though of how miserable the life of any prisoners, detainees or any persons deprived of their liberty could become once they assert their rights in seeking effective remedies, particularly convicted prisoners. Any persons accused of a crime faces the vulnerability of being detained for years without having their conviction effectively reviewed according to acceptable and established norms of what is an effective review as is stipulated in the Covenant once they are convicted. To deny any detainees or prisoners of their Constitutional rights to have their case reviewed promptly, effectively and adequately has made the judiciary responsible and complicit in depriving them of their rights.
By justifying the continued delay, the government has effectively accepted that in its judicial practice and administration of justice what is “undue”, which is also defined as an excessive or very inappropriate and exceeding what is appropriate or normal, has become lawful and acceptable.
Thus, a review of sentences dragging on for over eight years, the failure of the nine justices appointed to review the sentence to promptly conclude it and the lack of progress could not be questioned or challenged. These were all done according to law and the exercise of the judiciary’s power in administering justice and that needs to be accepted. They care nothing as to whether this conforms to the principle of the ICCPR’s General Comment on the definition of “undue” implying that there was nothing wrong with the delay. Thus, similar cases of court delays of this nature should no longer be a surprise.
However, defining what “undue delay” is and what constitutes a violation is based on what are the acceptable norms and standards under the ICCPR, and its interpretation is not exclusive to the Philippine government. And every State party to the ICCPR as the Philippines do must subscribed to this. But if the SC or CA would issue decisions or jurisprudence asserting that excessive court delays in reviewing sentences and so on, is acceptable then their actions may no longer be a question. However, they know full well this is irrational and the government has acknowledged that the principle of “speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases” is in fact embedded and fundamental to the Constitution and judicial practice. To accept court delays as a norm would have an enormous consequence on the very fabric of its justice system.
If these court delays were not norms and acceptable practice, the government should have not excused themselves of complicity to failure in administering justice committing violations to its obligations to the ICCPR, particularly on the prisoner’s right to effective review of their conviction. By failing to even acknowledge this fact and act on it adequately subverts the core principles in administration of justice to what is due and undue, effective and ineffective and what norms are acceptable or unacceptable under the Covenant. If these continue and are allowed to be tolerated, it will send the wrong message not only to these prisoners, but also to the legal practitioners, the judges and court justices, that court delays and their acts in failing to promptly resolve cases are justifiable and should be accepted.
