AS-055-2007
March 18, 2007
A Statement by the Asian Human Rights Commission
THAILAND: The real thinking behind the coup–“What do the people know?”
Last Monday, a week before the six-month anniversary of the September 19 military coup in Thailand, the March 12 edition of Matichon newspaper contained a lengthy interview with General Suchinda Kraprayoon, who led the coup in 1991. Suchinda was forced out of the prime ministership that he took unelected in 1992 after massive protests in Bangkok, in which hundreds are believed to have been killed and injured. Asked whether or not he still agrees with the idea that it is not necessary for the prime minister to be elected, Suchinda replied that he agrees “one hundred per cent”, and continued
“And I don’t agree with a constitution so full of details that it is impossible to move. The constitution shouldn’t have many sections, only what’s necessary. It should be written broadly… I also don’t agree with holding public hearings, because what will the people know? Even I myself haven’t read the previous constitutions, because I’m not a person who’s interested in politics. Go and ask the people how many sections there are [in a constitution]–they don’t know. So for what reason will you hold public hearings? What do the people know?”
Here is the real thinking of Thailand’s coup leaders, whether 2006, 1991 or earlier. In its plainest terms, it consists of the following: ordinary people know nothing; politicians have no legitimacy; constitutions are irrelevant.
The question that remains halfway through the one year promised by the interim government for it to complete its “tasks” is what kind of state can be devised under persons who themselves have no understanding of the principles of modern government? Thailand is a sophisticated country, yet its self-appointed leadership is unable to rise above the most primitive political expressions. When rulers themselves profess disinterest in the basic aspects of statecraft, as the generals in Thailand do routinely, what then becomes of the state?
By any definition, the rule of law, as opposed to rule by a person or group of persons, depends upon the minimising of arbitrary behaviour. This means, in the words of one jurist, Professor J A Jolowicz, that
“There must exist some technique for forcing the Government to submit to the law; if such a technique does not exist, the Government itself becomes the means whereby the law is achieved. This is the antithesis of the rule of law.”
The basic technique by which this is done in modern jurisdictions is through the introduction of a constitution. While no constitution is perfect, all must establish guidelines for the functioning of the state that minimise arbitrariness, together with institutional arrangements to ensure the rational settling of disputes. Where the basic guidelines of a constitution are more-or-less respected and carefully developed alongside institutions, there exists a foundation for the rule of law.
By contrast, a coup is the most arbitrary of all behaviour. It is the ultimate denial of the rule of law. It sends the message that there exist no such guidelines, however imperfect, and that some persons are entitled to act according to another set of standards altogether. In scrapping one constitution and ordering the writing of a new one, as has happened again in Thailand, coup leaders send out a message that constitutions are unimportant, elected officials have no special legitimacy, and the public has no authoritative voice in what goes on in their country. The message is reinforced by statements that reserve the right for the military to conduct future coups whenever so inclined. “I think that there will always be coups if there is cause for them,” General Saprang Kalayanamitr said recently.
Here is the real meaning of the September 19 coup: not the rule of law, but its antithesis. As the Asian Human Rights Commission has said from day one, the coup was never about the displacement of a person and the reform of institutions, as was pretended. It was about the displacement of the state and the retrogression of its institutions.
The challenge for Thailand remains today, as it has throughout its modern history, to break free from the deeply feudal thinking of its elite, and bring the sophistication and abilities of its wider society to its leadership. Six months after September 19, the challenge is as big as ever.
